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 It is a very special honor to present these Nathanson lectures, and not simply for the 
obvious reason that I was asked to join a very distinguished list of Nathanson lecturers.  I also 
have fond recollections of an earlier visit to the school–now more than twenty-five years ago, 
and I am an admirer of the work of several members of the San Diego faculty that intersects in 
various ways with my own.  But most of all Nat Nathanson, after whom the lectures are named, 
was a dear friend and colleague at Northwestern–and also a hero of mine–for many years.  The 
colleague relationship spanned twenty-four years, and the friendship came easily, and continues 
with Leah Nathanson who is well-known to you folks in San Diego, and who is here with us 
today.  The hero business perhaps requires a bit more explaining.  Nat was generous with 
younger colleagues like me floundering around a bit, but very demanding of himself.  He insisted 
on confronting the hard questions posed by positions that his instincts embraced.  I watched that 
over the years, and as a result I try to resist sloughing over difficulties as I puzzle through some 
problem.  I don’t think I satisfy the standard that Nat set, but I have no doubt that it is his own 
1Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.  My thanks 
to Richard Weisberg, Michael Herz, and John McGinnis for helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this lecture. 
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standard of intellectual rigor that helps me try.  Indeed Nat Nathanson remains such a part of my 
psychology that I was stunned to read in the today’s program material that he has been gone for 
more years than he was my colleague. 
 
 That said, I think Nat would be impatient by now for me to get on to my assigned task, 
and so without further ado I turn to some lessons for originalism from some things that go 
without saying in and around the United States Constitution. 
 
 What has come to be called “originalism” in constitutional interpretation has shown 
remarkable resilience.  Adherents to originalism are called “originalists,” and some of the 
sticktuitiveness is shown by originalists in these very halls.  I will have some critical things to 
say about originalism in action, but I do not want to be misunderstood by gracious hosts.  I do 
not come to bury originalism, but rather to set it free.   
 
 The word “originalism,” at least as often used by adherents, is just too tendentious, 
suggesting that with historical work and some clear headed thinking the Constitution can be 
mined for lots and lots of right answers to today’s problems.  The principal message I want to 
deliver today is that any such claim is woefully exaggerated.  The term “interpretivism” held 
sway for a time, first coined by Tom Grey and then popularized by John Ely.  Then Paul Brest 
came up with “originalism.”2  Brest meant the word only descriptively, and in my view we 
would have been better served by resisting the neo-neologism with its normative connotations.  
Still, I could live with “originalism” if adherents would only own up to the very large degree of 
choice that necessarily exists in the arena of constitutional interpretation.  Like it or not, that 
means that if we retain aggressive judicial review–and I see no signs of any contemplated 
2See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975); 
John Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 In. L.J. 399 (1978); John 
Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press 1980); Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1980). 
   
3
                                                          
abandonment–judges will provide substantial input into the complex of value choices that help 
define American public life. 
 
 Originalism, as I assume you all know, is the view that the appropriate guideposts for 
constitutional interpretation are “original” ones, sources that probe constitutional “meaning” by 
reference to the “meaning” entertained by the people around at the time the Constitution was 
enacted.  The resilience of the approach is remarkable in part because intractable puzzles just 
keep coming about what originalists mean by “meaning.”  
 
 One set of problems has been front and center.  There were quite a lot of those people 
around at the time the Constitution was formulated and adopted, and originalists have visibly 
struggled with the question of which among them counts in fathoming “meaning.”  One category 
of candidates is the authors of the Constitution, suggested by talk of “original intention.”  Then 
there is the initial audience for the document, suggested by talk of “original understanding.”  But 
there are questions of who plays those roles.  Are state ratifying conventions, for instance, 
authors or audience?3  And then more recently ascendant has been talk of “original meaning” 
which in a different way fudges the question of just whose meaning we’re talking about.  When 
pressed for a description of this fathomer of meaning, proponents of “original meaning” suggest 
something like “an ordinary and reasonable and informed user of the English language at the 
time the Constitution was promulgated.”4  
 Once one grapples with any of these formulations, further problems loom.  I’ll treat only 
3Jack Balkin collapses the two roles by referring to ratifiers as “authorizing audience.”  Jack M. 
Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const. Comm. xxx (2007) 
(forthcoming) [around note 46]. 
4See generally, Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 7-11 (Alfred A. Knopf 1996); Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 554 (2003); Gary Lawson & 
Guy Seidman, Originalism As a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const. Comm. 47, 48-49 & ns.10 & 11 
(2006) (where authorities are collected); Balkin, supra note [3], at note [49] (where several 
formulations are quoted)..  
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glancingly the difficult, interesting, and important set of questions about the level of specificity 
or generality at which meaning is to be pegged.  Nor will I dwell on the historiographical 
problems, or whether judges–or law professors, for that matter–are equipped to do, or to 
evaluate, that kind of work.5  And I will put to the side what I call the “summing problem,”6 
amalgamating meanings entertained by multiple people into some coherent whole–or maybe just 
a “whole,” whether coherent or not.  For each of the role players we could shroud the summing 
problem by use of a single hypothetical player, and that is what original meaning enthusiasts 
basically do.  Given the use of such hypothetical constructs, it turns out, as we shall see, that the 
choice of role players makes very little difference.7  For that reason, and for ease of discussion, 
except when I indicate differently I’ll be dealing with a hypothetical original fathomer of 
meaning, that reasonable user of English towards the end of the Eighteenth Century. 
 
 Originalists are sometimes divided into textualists and intentionalists, with the former 
insisting that subjective states of mind cannot be allowed to override the Constitution’s words.  
But words do not define themselves, singly, or in phrases, or in documents, so even self-styled 
textualists necessarily face an abundance of choices.  Is that reasonable person taken to be 
familiar with the whole document or just some phrase being interpreted?  How much does he 
know of formulations in the Constitution’s antecedents–the Articles of Confederation, for 
instance, or the Magna Carta?  Is he versed in the language of the law, or just colloquial English?  
Is he used to meticulous parsing of language, on the one hand, or is he prepared to deal with 
rhetorical flourishes, or occasional looseness, or for that matter sloppiness, in the use of 
language?  Has he thought through the consequences of one “meaning” or another that might be 
attached to his words?  And if not allowed to know the motivations of the authors, to what extent 
5See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 857, 861 (1989).  
6See Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity In Constitutional Law, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 445, 456, 459 
(1984). 
7See TAN [18], infra. 
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is the fathomer of meaning nonetheless informed about aspects of the historical setting in which 
the authors formulated their words?8  
 
 The importance of such questions is nicely illustrated by my favorite constitutional 
ambiguity, discussion of which was stimulated by what was billed as a “contest” announced in a 
1995 issue of the journal Constitutional Commentary.9  It then became the subject of sometimes 
playful discussion among constitutional scholars.10  
 
 When Article II says that “No person, except a natural born citizen of the United States, 
or a citizen at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of 
president”11 does the phrase “the United States” refer to an entity that came into existence only 
when the Constitution was adopted or was it an entity that predated the Constitution?  On the 
answer to that question George Washington’s eligibility to be the nation’s president might seem 
to have turned, for Article VII says that “Ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying.”  
Washington’s Virginia was not one of the first nine, so if “establishment” and “adoption” are the 
same thing, and the Constitution’s “United States” came into existence at that time, Washington 
would seem not to have met the citizenship requirement.12 
8“Many, if not most, of the provisions of the Constitution do not make sense except as they are 
given meaning by the historical background in which they were adopted.”  Antonin Scalia, Is 
There An Unwritten Constitution?, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (1989). 
9Contest: Was George Washington Constitutional?, 12 Const. Comm. 137 (1995). 
10See, e.g., Jordan Streiker, Sanford Levinson, & J.M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really 
Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 
237 (1995).  
11U.S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 5 (emphasis added). 
12See Paul Finkleman, Book Review: Intentionalism, the Founders and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 435, 441-42, n.25 (1996).  The same would be true for a number 
of other early presidents.  See Streiker, et. al, supra note [10], at 239-40.  Virginia’s ratification 
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 If one looks solely at the words of the most pertinent constitutional language–
supplemented by some ill-defined appreciation of ordinary uses of English–one could easily 
conclude that “the United States” came into existence upon ratification by the first nine, so that 
Washington was ineligible.  But if looks at other uses of the term “United States” in the 
Constitution13 and then at a larger historical context, that conclusion would be called into serious 
question.  For there was something called “the United States” that preexisted the Constitution.  
Thus the Articles of Confederation referred to the entity that it governed as “the United 
States.”14   
 
 But that in turn leads to some pretty awkward possibilities.  For what if Virginia had 
never ratified the Constitution?  Would Washington nonetheless have been a citizen of “the 
United States” referred to in Article II?  Or, worse yet, what about some previously unknown but 
ambitious and effective, but somewhat unsavory, political type–say someone like Aaron Burr–
from a state under the Articles that never signed up under the Constitution?15  It just couldn’t 
be–for a textualist at least–that the seemingly careful stipulation of qualifications in terms of 
“citizenship” would allow such a pretender from what had become a foreign country to become 
president.  But can our reasonable fathomer of meaning be allowed to think about consequences 
like that in ascribing “meaning” to the Constitution’s words?   
 
came four days after New Hampshire became the ninth state to sign on.  See Calvin H. Johnson, 
Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the Articles of Confederation Into the 
Constitution, 20 Const. Comm. 463, 464 (2003-04).  
13See, e.g., U.S. Const., Art. VI, § 2; ; see generally, Streiker et. al, supra note [10], at 240-42.   
  
14E.g., Art. of Confed., Art. I. 
15Say from Rhode Island which at the time of the Constitution had been called such things the 
“Quintessence of Villiany” and “a disgrace to the human race.”  See Johnson, supra note [12], at 
470-71.  Rhode Island was the last of the thirteen to sign on, but didn’t do so for almost another 
two years after Virginia became the tenth.  See Streiker et. al, supra note [10], at 238 , n.9.   
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 If the answer to that is in the affirmative, one might then be inclined–even if uneasily–to 
conclude that Washington was ineligible.  But if one is allowed to a look at the matter from a 
somewhat different angle, that judgment could be turned around once more.  Washington had 
been one of the pillars, perhaps the most solid pillar, of the revolutionary generation, and it was 
broadly assumed that he would become the first president if he was willing to serve.16  Can this 
part of the context in which the Constitution was scripted be considered to resolve this 
ambiguity?  
 
 When I teach about interpretation of contracts, legislation, and the United States 
Constitution respectively, I introduce a superhero for each context, called respectively Contract 
Man, Legislation Man, and Constitution Man, whose preoccupations in their super lives are to 
swoop down on the scene as the document within their superhero jurisdictions is being made 
binding and pose questions to those involved about application of what they have said to a 
problematic situation, usually one presented by a case we are discussing in class.  If Constitution 
Man were to have posed the question to those crafting the Constitution whether they really 
meant to suggest that of those alive at the time only citizens of the first nine states to ratify 
would be eligible to be president, I have little doubt that they would have voiced a consensus 
that they intended no such thing, that people from states among the thirteen that eventually 
joined would certainly be eligible.  For they knew the whole context, and they would not have 
wanted to make Washington–or, for that matter, others from states that eventually signed on–
ineligible.   
 
 But even for the real authors, if Constitution Man made a pest of himself and asked about 
our rogue citizen of a state that never ratified the Constitution, the authors would almost just as 
surely have said that he should not be eligible.  Asked if their language made that clear, the 
16See Johnson, supra note [12], at 466 & n.10 (collecting authority). 
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authors would, I imagine, turn sheepish.  The words they used give no hint of a distinction 
between states that eventually sign up and those that don’t.  I strongly suspect that they simply 
never considered the implications of what they said for “citizens” of states other than the first 
nine.  This is an example, in other words, of language used without great care.   
 
 Since Constitution Man wasn’t actually around to help set things straight, the present day 
interpreter must deal with ambiguity, and with sloppiness in the use of language.   In the context 
of statutory interpretation, doctrines of “absurd results” and of “scrivener’s errors” provide some 
leeway to avoid awkward apparent implications of the language used, but some originalists tend 
bravely to insist that we are to assume that constitutional language was used with great care, or 
at least must be understood as such.17  Poor George Washington.  Sensible interpretation would 
make him eligible, but originalist interpretation, if we could only figure out what it was, might 
not. 
 
 I have Constitution Man interrogating the Constitution’s authors, the harborers of 
“original intentions.”  But as mentioned earlier, originalists these days have largely abandoned 
original intention talk and gravitated to the construct of original meaning.  So how are we to 
think about what our reasonable fathomer of meaning would say?  That would depend on what 
we allowed that hypothetical person to know.  And you’ll find no ready consensus in originalist 
writing about just what parts of context can–or should–be taken into account.  Thus one lesson 
from this excursion into the George Washington eligibility question is that the more about 
context we allow our reasonable fathomer of meaning to know, the harder it is to distinguish him 
from a hypothetical single author of the Constitution.  In other words, whether there is any 
distinction between original intention, on the one hand, and original meaning, on the other, turns 
17See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights (Yale University Press 1998) and telling 
criticism of it in William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, 
Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 487 (2007); see also 
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 2006 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 39. 
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on non-obvious choices that originalists do not always acknowledge, but are nonetheless 
required.18 
 
 I am going to concentrate today on yet another conceptual problem for originalism, the 
fact that the world the Constitution must deal with today is very different from that of 1787.  The 
enormous changes in American society over the years have encouraged purported alternatives to 
originalism, often talked about these days as a “living Constitution.”19  Broadly speaking living 
constitutionalists insist that the understanding of the document must keep up with both changes 
on the ground and with different sets of values that may prevail today.  Living constitutionalists 
have even more conceptual difficulties than do originalists with questions of just what is to guide 
interpretation, and I’ll have a concluding remark or two about the notion.  But living 
constitutionalism aside, my focus today is on whether originalism is up to the task of providing 
real guidance for constitutional answers to problems that could not realistically have been 
foreseen. 
 
 Difficulties of this sort can be real enough for interpreting rather precise constitutional 
language, like the twin provisions of Article I that the Senate is to “be composed of two Senators 
from each state” and of Article IV that “no new State shall be formed . . . within the jurisdiction 
of any other State . . . without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned . . . .”  No 
matter what features of the context at the time we allow him to appreciate, our fathomer of 
meaning is not likely to have pondered the “meaning” of those provisions for the problem posed 
18For sometimes begrudging acknowledgment of the confluence of the two notions see Lawson 
& Seidman, supra note [4], at 56; see also Nelson, supra note [4], at 555-558.  Justice Scalia 
suggested at his confirmation hearings that there wouldn’t be a big difference between the two.  
See Balkin, supra note [3], at [25 n.9].  
19See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 695 
(1976); Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., at Georgetown University, reproduced in 
Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate 55 (Steven G. Calabresi, ed., Regnery Publishing Inc. 
2007). 
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by a state attempting to secede from the union, with a discrete portion that wanted none of such 
secession and then claimed to form a rival state government that was in no sense in control of the 
whole state, or granted any real authority by it, but nonetheless purported to consent on behalf of 
that whole to the creation of a new state out of that discrete portion.  That, of course, is basically 
what happened when West Virginia broke away from Virginia and was admitted as a new state 
in 1863, so that now, in apparent violation of the constitutional prescription of two, there are four 
Senators from what once was the state of Virginia.20 
 
 In the context of statutory interpretation those doctrines of absurd results and scrivener’s 
errors can sometimes be helpful here as well, but self-respecting originalists might stick to their 
guns should problems like West Virginia be presented today and insist that clear language 
meaning must be heeded–no question here that two means two, and consent really means 
consent, and that means real consent by the very state, not some portion of the state that simply 
says it can form a new government for the whole.21  To be sure, it is presumably too late to kick 
West Virginia out of the Senate and the union, and even the most fearless originalist would be 
well-advised not to try while Robert Byrd is around to object.  But errors may be made with any 
approach to interpretation, and the heroic originalist might insist that the fact of past errors is no 
excuse for countenancing new ones. 
 
 Much more nettlesome for the originalist–because at the heart of the most visible 
20See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 Calif. L. 
Rev. 291 (2002). 
21But in an otherwise wonderful article on the West Virginia problem two self-styled originalists 
do not stick to their guns.  Relying on a “legal fiction” (indeed, “one of the great constitutional 
legal fictions of all time”) that the part was the lawful government of the whole, Vasan Kesavan 
and Michael Paulsen rather find that the admission of West Virginia was–originalistically 
speaking–constitutional.  Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note [20], at 294, 300 et passim.  Dare I 
point out that if “legal fictions” can be allowed to do originalist work, the approach patently 
contains no constraints whatsoever? 
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contemporary constitutional controversies–is the problem presented by unforeseen problems that 
must be addressed with constitutional language that is not so precise.  We have already glimpsed 
the problem of ambiguity, but ambiguous language at least might seem to present a constrained 
set of possibilities.  Vague language poses the problem of lack of foresight much more 
insistently.  Examples of vague–but frequently invoked–constitutional phraseology are many–
due process of law, equal protection of the laws, unreasonable searches and seizures, cruel and 
unusual punishment, rights retained by the people.22   
 
 Vague constitutional language might seem to provide an opening for living 
constitutionalists,23 but the typical originalist move instead is a measure of intentionalism.  
Robert Bork, for instance, a hero among originalists,24 depicts the task of the modern day 
interpreter as finding a “principle” that “the Framers put into” the document, by examining its 
“text, structure, and history.”  Once found, the “principle” can then be applied to solve some 
modern problem, even if that particular problem had not been foreseen.  In this way, Bork tells 
us in a speech delivered on these very premises:   
 
We are able to apply the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause to the electronic 
media and to the changing impact of libel litigation upon all the media; we are 
able to apply the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures to electronic surveillance; we apply the Commerce Clause to state 
22U.S. Const., Ams. V, XIV, IV, VIII, IX. 
23See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comm. xxx (2007) 
(forthcoming); cf. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation 7 (University Press of 
Kansas 1999); Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 121-25 (Princeton University 
Press 2004). 
24See Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, in Calibresi, ed., 
supra note [19], at 1, 14. 
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regulations of interstate trucking.25 
  
 Today I want to concentrate not on the hushed tones of vague constitutional language, 
but on a dimension of constitutional interpretation that is seldom discussed, indeed not even 
much appreciated as presenting some difficulty.  These are problems posed by constitutional 
silence, things left unsaid.  For even more than vague language, constitutional silence can be 
easily ignored as time goes by.  The result is that the treatment of constitutional silence can be 
powerfully instructive about the application of the Constitution to problems that were not 
foreseen when the document was promulgated.   
 
 The Constitution leaves most things unsaid, of course.  It has nary a word about ancient 
Chinese art.  But that, of course, is not its subject.  Freedom of speech is one of its subjects, but it 
says nothing about communication over the internet.  Who knows if the Constitution might have 
said something about the internet had it been around at the time, but at least one reason the 
Constitution is silent about the internet is that nobody at the time foresaw that modern 
phenomenon.  But there is another big reason that the Constitution may be silent about some 
things.  They weren’t said because they didn’t need saying.  They were things, as we say, that go 
without saying.  They were simply assumed, and conceivably with even greater clarity than some 
things that were said. 
 
 Constitutional silence comes in many shapes and forms.  Bork mentioned the First 
Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press, and, of course, there is a free speech clause in 
the First Amendment as well.  But neither says anything, for instance, about non-speech 
25Robert H. Bork, Speech Delivered at the University of San Diego, November 18, 1985, in id. at 
83, 87.  Bork tended to talk of “original intention” and, mentioned, “original meaning” seems to 
be ascendant these days.  But, as we have see, see TAN [18], supra, the approach might be 
adapted to original meaning simply by allowing our fathomer of meaning to understand enough 
of what animated the authors so that he could appreciate the constitutional “principle” to be 
applied. 
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communication, like handwritten letters.  If the generation here today doesn’t know what those 
are, they were a precursor to email, and the constitutional generation produced a large quantity 
of them.26  No internet problem here.   
 
 In a widely noted essay, Justice Scalia tells us that letters “cannot be censored” by the 
government on account of the speech and press clauses, which he says, by a “reasonable 
construction” “stand as a sort of synecdoche for the whole.”27  But if the point is that the people 
responsible for the phraseology of the First Amendment–or the “reasonable” person fathoming 
the meaning at the time–would have understood the protection as extending generally to 
communication of all sorts, why wasn’t that said?  There may well be an explanation, like 
fixation on specific problems in the recent past, rhetorical flourish, or comfortable–but loose–use  
of language.  Bork’s discussion of electronic media shows that he would have little problem 
fitting Scalia’s move into his methodology.  He would say that one can “discover” a general 
“principle” of free and open communication, or some such thing.28  But I think the example 
begins to show a certain slipperiness on the slope of silence.   
 
26A book has recently been published of the very extensive handwritten correspondence between 
Abigail and John Adams.  My Dearest Friend: Letters of Abigail and John Adams (Margaret A. 
Hogan & C. James Taylor, eds. Belknap Press 2007). 
27Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation 3, 38 
(Princeton University Press 1997).  Justice Scalia has apparently taken a similar stance with 
things left unsaid in the Eleventh Amendment.  See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Interpretive Issues 
in Seminole and Alden, 55 S.M.U.L. Rev. 377, 380 (2002). 
28But perhaps that move is too fast.  Originalists  are merciless in criticism of Justice Douglas’ 
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, finding that several provisions of the Bill of Rights that 
protect aspects of personal privacy “have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees, that help give them life and substance.” 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).  Building from 
there, Douglas found a general protection for privacy that justified a conclusion that state 
restrictions on access of married couples to birth control devices was unconstitutional.  Bork 
criticizes Griswold as choosing a “level of abstraction” of the principle that “expanded [the Bill 
of Rights] beyond the known intentions of the Framers.”  Bork, supra note [25], at 90. 
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 Sometimes it is hard to discern any principles that might help fill silent spaces, let alone 
“principles” that were “put into” the document, though not in so many words.  One of my 
favorite examples is the Constitution’s failure to say anything about how the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court is to be chosen, or indeed how long his tenure of service in that office is to be.  
The only mention of a Chief Justice in the Constitution is in Article I where we are told that if 
the Senate is called upon to try an impeachment of the president, “the Chief Justice shall 
preside.”  Article III, where a provision for selecting the person to fill that office might have 
been expected to be placed, only comes close to the subject when it tells us that there is to be a 
Supreme Court and that it will have “Judges” on it who will serve “during Good Behaviour.”   
 
 Now it appears that Washington, once the qualification hurdle had been ignored and he 
had become President, assumed that he could nominate a Judge to be Chief Justice.  The 
extended drama of the first Chief’s replacement then eventuated in presidential nomination and 
Senate confirmation of a new Chief from among the sitting Justices.29  Nobody has seriously 
questioned presidential nomination and Senate confirmation since then, and a large number of 
duties–some quite sensitive–have been attached by legislation over the years to the office of 
Chief Justice.30   
 
 But there are other ways to choose a Chief Justice, some of which some state supreme 
courts used at the time.  The judges themselves might choose a chief, or seniority might be used, 
or the post could rotate.  Or the matter could be decided by statute.31  As far as “principles” go, I 
know of no discovery of one that would lead to the present system, and I can think of some 
candidates–like “separation of powers”–that would call presidential nomination and senatorial 
29See Edward T. Swaine, Hail, No: Changing the Chief Justice, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1709, 1716 
(2006). 
30See id. at 1711-13. 
31See id. at 1715 n.30.  Or the choice might be made by lot.  Id. at 1716 n.33. 
   
15
                                                          
confirmation into serious question.32  Just to give you an inkling of the problems that silence 
might invite, would it be open to a contemporary litigant–should he be able to surmount standing 
problems–to challenge one of those statutes giving the Chief Justice extensive powers beyond 
that of presiding over the Court’s sessions and deliberations because his appointment was in 
violation of a separation of powers “principle” put into the Constitution?  
 
 Some contemporary originalist commentators might argue that the silence on choice of 
the Chief Justice is an appropriate occasion for judicial “construction,” answers to questions 
where no “principle” is “fairly discoverable” in the document, here perhaps informed by practice 
over the years, where, of course, there has been a consistent approach to the manner of choosing 
the Chief Justice.33  Putting aside whether that is just a copout for a very important question 
about how that very powerful post is to be filled, some constitutional silences are more pregnant 
than this one. 
 
 I have three examples of pregnant silences that I want to use to illustrate how ill-
equipped originalism is for coming to grips with unforeseen problems.  They involve different 
types and shades of silence, and their substantive implications intersect in interesting ways.  
They are first, the silence, not entirely of the Constitution itself, but even more of the federal 
courts, about the Guarantee Clause; second, the stunning silence of the Constitution itself about 
any role for political parties in American public life; and finally, the Constitution’s provisions 
for an electoral college to choose our president, which say nothing explicit about whether 
electors can be bound to the choice they signaled beforehand to the voters who put them in 
office.   
 
32See id. at 1724. 
33See generally Barnett, supra note [23], at 118-30; Whittington, supra note [23], at 7-13.    
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 The Constitution’s Article IV says that “The United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”34  This is variously known as the “Guarantee 
Clause” and the “Republican Form of Government Clause.”  There are lots of questions that the 
phraseology might raise, but one might have thought that originalists would dwell on the central 
concern about just what makes a form of government “republican.”  I have by no means mined 
the historical materials for all they are worth, but I think it fair to say that the two major 
candidates are first a government answerable ultimately to the people, rather than a monarchy or 
an aristocracy, and second, a more constrained version of the first, and the more likely 
“principle” to be found if there is one that was somehow “put into” the Constitution, popular 
government in which policy choices are made by a representative assembly.   
 
 The question is particularly interesting because this second answer would raise the most 
serious doubts about the republican bona fides of a great deal of what is called “direct 
democracy” in modern American state governance.  Basically these are the processes of 
initiative, referendum and recall, and there is no reason to think they were foreseen by authors, 
audience, or reasonable fathomers of meaning at the time the Guarantee Clause was made law.35   
 
 Direct democracy along these lines is quite familiar to you Californians, and to citizens 
of a number of other states as well.  And its processes are controversial.  There are certainly 
plausible arguments on both sides of the question of whether they are healthy parts of the mix of 
decisionmaking in the states, but the policy arguments against direct democracy are very 
weighty.  It is not conducive to detailed debate and deliberation among the ultimate 
decisionmakers, nor to a process of compromise characteristic of legislative assemblies.  These 
are just the kinds of objections that would be marshaled against direct democracy if judicial 
                                                          
34U.S. Const., Art. IV § 4. 
35See Rick Hasen, When “Legislature” May Mean More Than “Legislature:” Initiated Electoral 
College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 Hast. Con. L.Q.    ,      (forthcoming 2008). 
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review of its constitutionality were possible under the Guarantee Clause.  Challengers would 
urge, as a leading historian of the times of the Constitution’s promulgation (and a former 
Nathanson lecturer) put it: “[r]epublicanism . . . logically presumed a legislature in which the 
various groups in the society would realize ‘the necessary dependence and connection’ each had 
upon the others.”36  
 But the federal judiciary will entertain no such test.  Direct democracy came into fashion 
in the progressive era around the turn of the last century.  Oregon was a leader, and a 1902 
amendment to the Oregon Constitution provided that “the people reserve to themselves power to 
propose laws and amendments to the [state] Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the 
polls, independent of the legislative assembly . . . .”  A 1906 tax law passed under this initiative 
procedure, and a refusal to pay the tax by Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Company, led to 
a 1912 decision by the United States Supreme Court.37  Relying on the 1849 decision in Luther 
v. Borden,38 the Court held that Guarantee Clause questions, including that pressed by the 
telephone company, were nonjusticiable “political questions.”  They were for the Congress, the 
“political department.”39 
 
 There has been no serious move by the federal courts to revisit this holding, and 
Congress has shown little interest in judging the validity of direct democracy.  Nor have state 
courts taken seriously the large question of the republican bona fides of direct democracy.  At 
the same time, however, many challenges to specific pieces of legislation or to state 
constitutional provisions enacted by direct democratic processes are entertained by state courts40 
36See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 179 (University of 
North Carolina Press 1969). 
37Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
3848 U.S. 1 (1849). 
39223 U.S. at 149. 
40See, e.g., VanSickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973). 
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and also by federal courts.41   
 
 In holding republican form of government questions non-justiciable, the Supreme Court 
did not deny that there are answers to the constitutional questions, only that the judiciary is the 
place for those answers to be given.  If the answer to the Guarantee Clause question could be 
illegitimacy, however, how is a self-respecting originalist to think about the legitimacy of some 
measure passed by a process that is constitutionally rotten from the outset?  There is, I think, no 
good answer to that question.  
 
 There are both smaller and larger versions of the dilemma.  Many constitutional tests turn 
on the motivation with which legislation (or some regulation) was passed.42  The summing 
problem that I mentioned earlier haunts the ascription of motivation to legislation as well as to 
constitutional provisions, but the problems are multiplied many times for direct democratic 
measures, where hundreds of thousands of individual decisionmakers are involved.  And their 
real motivations are especially unfathomable because of the secrecy of the ballot.  A common 
technique in the law to deal with difficulties of proof is a presumption.  But if that approach were 
used here, should there be a presumption of benign motivation, or malign?  Can a satisfactory 
originalist answer really be given to that question oblivious to the unaddressed matter of 
republican bona fides? 
 
 Another small scale problem is a hot button issue right now here in California.  The 
Constitution assigns various functions to state “legislatures.”   They originally chose United 
States Senators.  They are to play a role in constitutional amendment.  They can regulate the 
time, place, and manner of elections for Senators and Representatives.  They are the bodies the 
41See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
42See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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consent of which is necessary for the formation of new states out of their territories.  And they 
are given the authority to determine the “manner” of choosing presidential electors.43  The 
November ballot in California may well present an initiative which would purport to exercise 
this last power by changing California from a winner-take-all system of choosing electors to one 
where each congressional district has a separate election for an elector.  Can there be an 
originalist answer to the constitutionality of this way of proceeding that blinds its eye to the 
Guarantee Clause question?   
 
 And then there is an even more momentous–large scale–issue, how we are to approach 
problems of federalism–state prerogatives–that so vex much of contemporary constitutional 
law.44  That is another important matter on which there is more constitutional muffle than sound.  
But that has not stopped strong feelings about federalism from surfacing on the Supreme Court, 
in the opinions of both self-described originalists and others.45  Is it even meaningful, however, 
to puzzle about an originalist answer to those questions that ignores the republican bona fides of 
so much state decisionmaking?   
 
 There is, I fear, no originalist trail for those questions either.  This seems rather obvious 
for states where robust direct democratic procedures are found.  But then could it really not also 
be so for old-fashioned states like mine–Illinois–where direct democracy has not much been 
embraced?  For could an originalist in the name of federalism countenance different sets of state 
prerogatives depending upon variable decisionmaking structures in the states?  
 
43See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3, cl. 1, § 4, cl. 1; Art. II, § 1, cl. 2; Art. IV, § 3; Art. V. 
44Compare, e..g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528 (2000) with, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1 (2005).  On the possibility of contemporary confusion, see Johnson, supra note [12], 
at 492-93.   
45See, e.g., the opinion of Justice Thomas, for himself and Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor and 
Scalia in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995). 
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 None of these problems has been addressed explicitly in Supreme Court opinions, either 
by asking the republican form of government question, or by asking how one should factor in the 
self-imposed silence on that question.  But what is perhaps most interesting is that the Court 
often seems to embrace direct democracy with enthusiasm, singing its praises as “devotion to 
democracy.”46  And that seems to be the stance adopted by the two self-described originalists on 
today’s Supreme Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas.  In opinions testing specific direct 
democratic measures, they have intimated that direct democracy is especially virtuous, providing 
more reason to uphold such measures than if they had been adopted by legislatures.  In one 
decision, for instance, Justice Scalia refers to the initiative process as “this most democratic of 
procedures.”47  And in a different case Justice Thomas criticized the majority opinion from 
which he was dissenting for failing to explain “why giving effect to the people’s [direct 
democratic] decision would violate ‘democratic principles’ that undergird the Constitution.”48   
 
 My point is not that there are better originalist answers to the questions posed in those 
cases than the answers provided by our two originalist Supreme Court justices.  Nor am I 
proposing better answers of any sort.  The first lesson I draw rather is that there are no originalist 
answers, because the trail has been lost.  The Constitution’s and the Court’s silences on the 
republican form of government clause has left a gaping hole in addressing questions raised by 
specific direct democratic measures.  A second lesson is in many ways more important.  Other–
very important–constitutional matters are closely touched by republican form of government 
concerns.  Silence on the one confounds analysis of the others in originalist terms.  More lost 
trails.   
 
46See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976), favorably 
citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971). 
47Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996). 
48U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 883 (1995). 
   
21
                                                          
 And a third lesson is taught by our self-described originalists who sing the praises of 
“democratic principles.”  Where do they get those “principles”?  Not from originalist inquiries, 
at least as of 1787, that is for sure.  For whatever one thinks the Guarantee Clause means, the 
meaning fathomer at the time would not have thought that today’s embrace of popular rule was 
implied by anything in the Constitution.  The franchise was restricted at the time.  Slaves, of 
course, could not vote, nor could women.  Nor could lots of adult men either.  And Senators 
were not elected.  Now to be sure there have been lots of amendments to the Constitution since 
that time, and they do reflect an increasing devotion to popular election and adult suffrage.  
Whether original meaning is to be pegged at the time–or should I say “times”?–of amendments 
or of the original Constitution, or somehow at some amalgam of those times, is yet another 
puzzle of originalism that I will have to leave unattended today.49 
 
 But even if we could wrestle down that question on a theoretical level, there is not much 
of a puzzle at all about where our originalist judges get their enthusiasm for “democracy.”  They 
get it not by puzzling about the relevance of this amendment or that, but from contemporary 
American values that they have absorbed.  This example is one where the gravitation to those 
contemporary values is, I think, right out in the open for all to see.   
 
 My next example is one where the constitutional silence is quite deafening.  Political 
parties are central players in American political life, but they are nowhere mentioned in the 
Constitution.  It does not take much knowledge of constitutional history to appreciate why.  
Parties were viewed at the time as forces to be marginalized and controlled as best as possible.  
When he wrote the Tenth Federalist, Madison surely had political parties in mind as examples of 
“factions” when he wrote: “[b]y a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting 
to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
49But see note [55], infra.   
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aggregate interests of the community.”50  For Madison, factions, including parties, were 
mischievous because of their inclination and capacity to interfere with wholesome governance in 
which a “small number of citizens elected by the rest” would have the “wisdom” to “best discern 
the true interest of their country.”  That, of course, harks back to our republican form of 
government question.  But more to the present point, in Madison’s mind the large republic that 
the Constitution was fashioning would multiply the factions seeking a piece of the action, with 
the result that they would stymie one another and end up making all less capable of mischievous 
interference with wholesome decisionmaking. 
   
 To be sure, parties did emerge not long thereafter, and Madison was a central player in 
one of the major ones.  Those first incarnations of political parties in American politics did not 
view themselves as mischievous “factions” but rather as collaborative enterprises by genuine 
seekers of the public good.  That probably allowed Madison and others to reconcile their disdain 
for factions with their party activity.  But it was only a few decades later that parties had 
unabashedly assumed their modern factional faces.  Now political parties may well be necessary 
to coordinate mass sentiment in a functioning democracy.  Some version of that rationale is the 
usual justification for political parties offered by students of democratic governance.51   But 
there was barely a hint of such a rationale in the air as the Constitution was being crafted.   
 Fast forward to the modern day.  For many reasons there is a great deal of tension in the 
way constitutional law treats parties, but it is not recognizably tension born of power asserted in 
50As one commentator puts it more generally in a classic study of political parties in the United 
States, “the Founding Fathers. . . . did not believe in political parties as such, scorned those that 
they were conscious of as historical models, [and] had a keen terror of party spirit and its evil 
consequences . . . .”  Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System viii (University of 
California Press 1969).  Two more recent commentators describe the Constitution’s framers as “ 
despis[ing] . . . political parties.”  Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, 
Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2313, 2313 (2006). 
51See generally, Hofstadter, supra note [50], at 212-71; Levinson & Pildes, supra note [50], at 
2380. 
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fact in the face of constitutional disfavor.  Much of the modern tension focuses on whether 
parties are state actors subject to constitutional restrictions as such, or private actors entitled to 
constitutional protections.52  I think it fair to say that this modern tension would be 
unrecognizable, even bewildering, to the constitutional generation, at least unless we could 
somehow educate its members about–and thereby reconcile them to–what had happened with 
parties and politics in the United States in the intervening 220 years. 
 
 So how is our self-respecting originalist to think about the constitutional status of 
political parties?  The problem here is as much new worlds as lost trails.  And unlike popular 
decisionmaking, there is not much in the way of later constitutional amendment–words instead 
of silence–to help out.53  So will it do to note the silence and thus conclude that the Constitution 
has no relevance for the status of political parties?  Original meaning enthusiasts of a textualist 
bent might take that position, though we have seen that the call of context can be pretty 
compelling and also that inferences about things left unsaid are often drawn from things said.  Is 
it so clear that the sounds of the silence about political parties fail to convey a pretty clear–
original–message if one does diligent work to find the message of history and then tries to abide 
by the message? 
 
52See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).  For an instructive rendition of the history 
of this tension, see Leon Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold 155-199 (University of 
Wisconsin Press 1986) (chapter entitled “Parties As Public Utilities”). 
53The most promising possibility is probably the Twelfth Amendment.  Originally presidential 
electors cast two votes undifferentiated between president and vice-president.  If a single person 
received a majority of the appointed electors, he became president, and the runner-up became 
vice-president.  See U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 3.  But after political parties came on the scene, 
they slated candidates for the two offices, and electors generally followed the lead of the parties.  
That led to a tie in the 1800 election, and one big mess.  That in turn resulted in passage of the 
Twelfth Amendment, separating the votes for president and vice-president.  The Amendment 
doesn’t explicitly mention political parties, but awareness of what led to its adoption shows that 
they were just offstage, influencing what the Amendment did say.  See Robert W. Bennett, 
Taming the Electoral College 20-24 (Stanford University Press 2006). 
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 Luckily–or perhaps unluckily–there really is no such choice.  For the fact of political 
parties inescapably bears on all sorts of things that the Constitution does say, or pretty clearly 
implies.  This is like the federalism problem in light of republican form of government concerns, 
only in a form not even an insistent textualist could evade. 
 
 Consider, for instance, a recent Supreme Court decision concluding, inter alia, that 
severe restrictions placed by Vermont on campaign contributions by political parties violated the 
First Amendment’s free speech guarantee, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.54  There is a large set of interpretational questions raised by 
the Vermont scheme,55 but I want to concentrate on a relatively simple one that is almost never 
noticed or discussed.  Are political parties protected by the Constitution’s rather explicit 
solicitude for freedom of speech?  
 
 The First Amendment’s protection of “freedom of speech” sounds sweeping: “the 
54Randall v. Sorrell, 126 Sup. Ct. 2479 (2006). 
55For instance, is the Bill of Rights–including the First Amendment–applicable to the states 
through incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment?  If so, through what clause, the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, or the Due Process Clause?  If we settle those questions in favor of 
incorporation, is the content of the First Amendment, passed at one time in our nation’s history, 
the same as its Fourteenth Amendment version, incorporated some seventy years later?  And if 
they are the same, is the “meaning” we are to fathom an Eighteenth or a Nineteenth Century one.  
Originalists disagree on these questions as well.  Compare Barnett, supra note [33], at 108, with 
Lawson & Seidman, supra note [4], at 73-76.  The answers to these questions would no doubt 
require grappling with the tensions of federalism, but are today’s versions of those tensions 
normatively congruent with those of the Eighteenth Century, or of the Nineteenth?  See Terrance 
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1042 (1979).   
 Query whether there are answers to these questions that could plausibly be ascribed to 
our hypothetical individual–wherever we situate him in the time dimension–but if we did settle 
them we would still have additional ones about the content of the guarantee of free speech.  Even 
apart from political parties, is it available to corporate bodies.?  Does it forbid just prior 
restraints, or does it reach as well post-speech penalties?  Is the contribution of money to another 
who will do the speaking protected?  And then what are we to do with the problem of precedent–
intermediate judicial decisions–on any of these questions?     
   
25
                                                          
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging” that freedom.  But we have already seen that Justice 
Scalia is willing to take some liberties with its apparent literal reach.  And indeed I know of no 
constitutional theorist who doesn’t acknowledge that some restrictions on speech are permissible 
and that some communicative non-speech is protected.  In any event, the clause tells us precious 
little about just who enjoys that “freedom” or indeed just what is meant by “freedom.”  So are 
political parties entitled to this “freedom”?   
 
 We could well imagine that Madison and his compatriots would be disdainful of any 
suggestion that political parties could seek shelter under that capacious umbrella.  Perhaps 
“freedom of speech” only belongs to individuals.  It could be argued that that is one reason that 
the institution of “the press” is mentioned separately.  Of course I have no idea how Madison and 
his co-conspirators would have addressed this question, or a host of others about political parties 
and their attempts to get the word out.  And that is just the point.  History has left behind the 
vision that actors contemporaneous with the Constitution’s formation held of political parties, 
and there is no way to recapture their world and refashion ours in its image.   
 
 A second instructive case, again from this state, compounds the complications of the 
status of political parties with that of direct democracy.  This is the Supreme Court’s 2000 
decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones, written for the Court by Justice Scalia.56  By 
initiative California had attempted to change its system for party nominations from a closed 
primary to a blanket primary.  Under the old system, a California primary voter received a ballot 
of his declared party alone, and he chose as he wished among those seeking that party’s 
nomination for the various offices to be filled at the general election.  In the new–initiated–
system, in contrast, a primary voter received a ballot with all candidates of all parties listed, and 
he could cross party lines as often as he wanted in voting for party nominees for the various 
offices.  Supporters of the blanket primary had touted it as encouraging more politically 
56530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
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moderate nominees.  In one formulation that the Court discussed, the blanket primary was 
defended  as “expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan concerns.”57   
 
 In response to a challenge by the California Democratic Party, the Court held that the 
blanket primary interfered with the first amendment rights of individuals to associate in political 
parties, though it also spoke of “the political association’s [i.e., the party’s] right to exclude.”58  
The opinion is suffused with concern for preserving the central political role played by political 
parties.  Along the way Justice Scalia noted that “[t]he formation of national political parties was 
almost concurrent with the formation of the Republic itself.”59 
 
 This last comment is a bit ironic for an originalist, because, as mentioned earlier, that 
“almost concurrence” made a large difference.  The Jones opinion makes no attempt to fathom 
original intention, understanding, or meaning with regard to political parties–or with regard to 
direct democracy.  Nor is that surprising, since political parties are right in the middle of 
contemporary American politics, and there is no way in our world to return us to some vision of 
their role held or understood at the time of the Constitution.  Originalism would be hopelessly at 
sea if we turned to it–in any of its forms–to guide us to some secure harbor where we could come 
up with an answer to the blanket primary by initiative question. 
 
 Political parties also bedevil a problem posed by my final example of constitutional 
silence.  This is one I have written about before.60  Much discussed in the literature on the 
electoral college is the problem of “faithless electors,” electors who cast their presidential or 
57Id. at 582. 
58Id. at 575. 
59Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
60See Bennett, supra note [53], at 95-121. 
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vice-presidential votes differently from what the voters who voted them into office were led to 
believe.  The constitutional question I have in mind is whether such faithlessness can be 
forbidden by state law.   
 
 While faithless votes have never changed the outcome of a presidential election, there 
have been a number of such votes over the years, about a dozen by most counts.  There was, for 
instance, a “faithless” abstention of a District of Columbia elector in the 2000 election, and a 
Minnesota elector in 2004 voted “faithlessly” for John Edwards for President, rather than for 
John Kerry.  Even more suggestive is the case of Richie Robb, a prominent Republican in West 
Virginia who was slated by his party for the post of presidential elector in the 2000 election, and 
then announced before the election that he did not think that he could vote for George Bush in 
the electoral college balloting.  The Republicans carried West Virginia, and Robb must have 
voted for Bush in the state’s secret electoral college balloting, because all the West Virginia 
electors did.  Robb thus doesn’t count in the dozen or so faithless votes over the years.  But you 
can be sure that he would have been vigorously courted by the Democrats if there had been no 
Florida controversy and, say, an apparent electoral college tie or an apparent victory for Gore by 
two votes.   
 
 Some commentators, no doubt inspired by originalist themes, find it obvious that the 
answer to the constitutional question is “no, faithlessness cannot be forbidden” because the 
original idea of the electoral college was of a discretion-laden set of decisionmakers who would 
meet in their various states to debate and decide how they would vote.  This is a “principle” that 
they presumably find the framers “put into” the electoral college provisions.  A state law that 
forbade faithlessness, it is argued, would violate that principle.61  
 
 The provision of Article II that entered into our discussion of the meaning of 
61See id. at 15-17 and accompanying notes.   
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“legislature” says that “[e]ach state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct a [defined] Number of Electors . . . ; but no Senator or Representative, or person holding 
an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”  The casting 
and counting of electoral votes is then dealt with, as follows, in the Twelfth Amendment:  
 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President 
and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same 
state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as 
President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President, and they 
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for . . . which lists they shall sign and 
certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, 
directed to the President of the Senate.  The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and 
the votes shall then be counted; . . . . 
 
 While this says nothing explicit about elector discretion, even an interpreter cast in the 
role of the fathomer of original meaning might readily infer that electors were to have discretion.  
Many “principles” that originalists like Bork and Scalia–and lots and lots of academics as well–
find were “put into” the Constitution–like the devotion to “democracy” that we discussed–are the 
result of interpreter choice rather than of anything more genuinely thought of as original 
intention or original meaning.  But I wouldn’t make that claim for a conclusion about elector 
discretion.  The language is itself suggestive.  Some have found the mention of a “ballot” to 
imply choice.  And why be concerned that an elector not be a Senator or Representative and not 
hold an office of “trust or profit under the United States,” unless one was worried about 
poisoning the exercise of discretion.  But even more fundamentally, the office of elector has no 
apparent purpose if electors were simply to cast votes that had already been determined for them.  
Not to put too fine a point on it, elector discretion is not explicitly mentioned, probably because 
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it was thought to be obvious.   
 
 To be sure, in the first two elections Washington received a presidential vote from each 
and every elector who cast votes.62   That, however, was not on account of any formal 
precommitment, but rather because Washington seemed the natural choice.  As suggested earlier, 
the framers would likely have told Constitution Man that Washington would be the first 
President if he made himself available, but if Constitution Man pressed them–or for that matter a 
fathomer of meaning at the time–on what would happen in the selection process once 
Washington was no longer available for the office, they would even more surely have responded 
with a picture of discretion-laden discussion, debate, and then voting at those meetings of 
electors.  If the Constitution implies with reasonable clarity that Constitution Man would elicit 
an affirmative response to the question of elector discretion back then, however, does it also 
answer the contemporary question of the faithless elector?   
 
 We are perhaps given a hint of an answer by the changed terminology.  Just how did a 
wholesome thing like “discretion” come to be talked about as a breach of faith?  And the answer 
starts with our old friend, political parties.  As Justice Scalia’s remark suggested, change in that 
aspect of our public life came very rapidly in the early years under the Constitution, so that by 
the time Washington was nearing the end of his second four-year term and had made clear his 
intention not to seek a third, the beginnings of what we might now recognize as two major 
national parties were in plain sight.  Many candidates for legislative office identified with one or 
the other of those parties.  Congressional caucuses of the two parties then designated candidates 
for President and Vice-President for the election of 1796, and many of those chosen as electors 
62As mentioned earlier, at the time electors cast two votes for president, for two different 
persons.  U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 3; see note [52], supra.  Not all the states had ratified the 
Constitution in time for the first election, however, and in addition New York, which was on 
board, failed to designate electors.   See John R. Koza et al., Every Vote Equal: A State-Based 
Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote 40-42 (National Popular Vote Press 
2006). 
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at the state level signaled a party affiliation as well.  Parties then tried to orchestrate what would 
take place at the elector meetings, by insinuating party fidelity as a major consideration for 
selection as an elector.  The possibility of faithlessness was born, and really quite early in the 
history of the Republic.   
 
 The reality of faithlessness, however, took a while to sink in, as American politics 
underwent large scale change with those political parties smack dab in the middle.  I am  
concentrating on how we choose a president, for it should suffice to draw the stark contrast 
between the world the Constitution envisaged and our own.  But make no mistake.  Today’s 
broader world of politics would be unrecognizable to those who were drafting, understanding 
and attempting to fathom the meaning of the Constitution at our constitutional beginnings. 
 
 On what is universally called “election day” in early November every four years, in 
addition to whatever state and local offices are in play, we are, under an originalist way of 
thinking, supposed to be voting not for presidential and vice-presidential candidates–but for 
those electors.  It is they who are then supposed to elect the nation’s executive officers when 
they meet in their respective states some forty days later. Now how many of you knew that? 
 
 This is a pretty sophisticated audience, so there may be a few of you who could honestly 
answer “yes.”  But I’m pretty sure that even those did not learn it from experience as a voter.  In 
most states, the names of electors do not even appear on the ballot.  In Illinois there is no hint on 
the ballot of a role for them.  And states that do provide a hint typically do so in fine print.  The 
large print is reserved for the name–and political party designation–of party candidates.  The 
result is that voters think they are voting directly for presidential and vice-presidential candidates 
nominated by political parties–as a tied pair, moreover–not for electors who will themselves 
choose the executive officers–in separate exercises of choice–weeks later. 
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 So how might we recapture some original meaning about elector discretion?  Discretion 
might, I suppose, be permissible even if we called it “faithlessness,” but if so we would also have 
to do something about the situation that has even allowed that inappropriate terminology to creep 
into our political discourse.  Presidential candidates’ names surely couldn’t appear on the ballot, 
for that is effectively an assertion of precommitment.  It fools the voter, and is inconsistent with 
that vaunted discretion.  Nor could political party designations appear, for the dual reasons that 
they too suggest precommitment, and because it puts political parties in the middle rather than at 
the margins of the political process.  But you get the point.  We cannot realistically hope to 
recapture some original vision of presidential elections, because we have traveled so far from 
that vision that it would tear the fabric of presidential selection apart if we tried–and quite 
possibly American democracy with it. 
 
 There is a lesson here about the ways language can be deceptive.  The contemporary 
issue of elector faithlessness can be cast as one of “discretion.”  And put simply in terms of 
discretion, original intention, or meaning is seemingly discernible.  But the issue back then was 
imbedded in a large and complex context that bears scant resemblance to that of the issue today.  
That is why we speak of “faithlessness” today.  If the issue back then and the issue today are 
understood in their respective settings, they are not the same issue at all.  Talk of “discretion” 
can appear to make them the same, but that is only because language necessarily oversimplifies a 
complex reality.  
 
 I chose these examples of things not addressed with any explicitness because I think they 
help us see how the march of history can obscure constitutional issues that may once have 
seemed relatively straightforward.  But that phenomenon does not depend on silences.  
Constitutional silence can cloud over an issue, so that its pertinence at any given point in time is 
made more difficult to see.  But even for reasonably precise constitutional language, today’s 
issue can be worlds removed from what the draftsmen–or original fathomer of meaning–would 
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have said came to mind.  That was the lesson that I meant to convey in the discussion of West 
Virginia.  Vague constitutional language in many ways is closer to silence in allowing the 
constitutional significance of change to go unnoticed.  Indeed the line between what is said and 
unsaid is far from a bright one.  It might well seem, for instance, that the Constitution addresses 
more explicitly the question of elector discretion than it does just what is protected by the Ninth 
Amendment’s unadorned mention of “rights.” 
 
 So what are we to do?  There is an arena for constitutional questions where the 
constitutional language seems to provide an answer in a relatively straightforward way.  To be 
president, for instance, an individual must have “attained to the age of thirty five years.”63  And 
the virtue of a nice clear answer to what age is necessary would probably overwhelm any 
argument that the purpose behind the requirement is a certain maturity and that these days that 
can be attained earlier (or later) than thirty five.64  But this problem has another feature that is 
seldom noted.  Any age qualification is going to be arbitrary, so that no underlying principle is 
likely to be discernible that might provide serious guidance for deviations from the seemingly 
clear language. 
 
 Where principles are more obviously at work, however, even precise language might be 
approached with more abandon, especially when events put on pressure, as in West Virginia 
example.  Be that as it may, however, the real problems arise when, for one reason or another, 
the language just doesn’t do the trick.  This is vague language, or in examples we have traversed 
today, little or no language at all.  If a contemporary problem arises under such language that 
differs in no discernible normative dimension from a problem that was a matter of focused 
63U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
64In a much-noted lecture, Justice Scalia invokes a subtle and interesting example where rather 
specific language is taken to overwhelm arguable changes in the normative dimension of 
confrontation clause problems.  See Scalia, supra note [5], at 855-56 (discussing Coy v. Iowa, 
487 U.S. 1012 (1988)). 
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concern at the time the Constitution was crafted, then an originalist answer–whether styled a 
matter of intention, understanding or meaning–is available, and would probably be readily 
embraced.  I say “probably” because we really have very little to go on to test the proposition.  
Whether a contemporary problem differs from a problem of original concern in a discernible 
normative dimension will typically be contestable.  And not surprisingly after 220 years, 
arguments that the issues “are not the same” will quite often be more than plausible.  If nothing 
else, I hope my excursions today into the meaning of constitutional silences will have made that 
clear. 
 If originalism fails to provide answers to so many contemporary questions, where are we 
to turn for those answers?  This is not the occasion for me to provide any full discussion of 
alternatives, which is not to suggest that I have a nicely packaged set of them to be delivered at 
my next lecture.  But part of the answer is simple judicial choice.  It could be called a “living 
Constitution,” but Justice Scalia would say that it is the displacing of democratic decisionmaking 
with the whims of “nine lawyers.”65 
 
 Now I am far from a full-throated defender of the present reach of judicial review.  But 
for several reasons I also think that the “whim” point is overstated.  There is no canonical 
definition of democracy that allows the stark contrast between decisions of appointed judges and 
those of elected officials.  As mentioned, the original constitutional scheme had United States 
Senators appointed by state legislatures.66  But even now, by some plausible ways of parsing the 
notion of “democracy,” the Senate–even without the institution of the filibuster–is quite 
undemocratic.67  And those appointed judges get appointed through a process that requires the 
65Scalia Slams ‘Living Constitution’ Theory, Associated Press (March 14, 2006); see Rehnquist, 
supra note [19], at 695 (1976) (“nonelected members of the federal judiciary . . . . responsible to 
no constituency whatever . . . .”) 
66U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
67See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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assent of two different kinds of elected officials.   
 
 The decisions of those judges, moreover, are not unconstrained and unchecked.  The 
Supreme Court has a degree of control over its agenda, but a good deal less than legislatures, or 
even the executive.  And a good part of the Court’s agenda control is legislatively sanctioned.  
There is, moreover, a variety of other legislative checks on the Court’s freedom to maneuver, 
from control over budgets and jurisdiction, all the way up to the impeachment possibility.  And 
there are norms of decisionmaking–precedent, political question doctrine, deference to other 
decisionmakers–that judges internalize.   
 
 I am no romantic about these things.  I’ll listen carefully to suggestions about how one 
might rein in judicial discretion.  But I fervently believe that those possibilities lie more in the 
realm of culture and politics than in any promise of restraint through something called 
“originalism.”   
 
 Let me conclude by providing a different vision of judicial review than the application of 
“principles” that were somehow put into the Constitution to some contemporary problem.  Once 
judicial review takes hold, the Constitution functions as the starting point for a process, not as a 
set of directions–an “instruction manual,” as some originalists would have it.68  Once set in 
motion, a good part of its life–just like yours and mine–is defined by what happened yesterday.  
And just like your life and mine, the process must adjust to what has happened around it.  I often 
find myself yearning for more clear cut answers to the problems that life throws up.  But wishing 
does not make them available.  And so it is with the United States Constitution.  It can solve 
some things pretty cleanly, like how old a presidential candidate must be.  But with most of the 
interesting things it leaves us to struggle.   
 
68Or a “blueprint.”  See Lawson & Seidman, supra note [4], at 52. 
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 This is so even when there are words to provide a measure of guidance.  Those words can 
easily mislead.  Not even the words of instruction manuals fill up all the spaces for machines or 
chemical processes they typically instruct about.  But the Constitution is not in many of its 
provisions anything like an instruction manual, and American democracy is not much like a 
machine either.  We must struggle with the problems that the intersection of the Constitution and 
our democracy throws our way.  If judges are doing the struggling and they take the originalist 
approach seriously, they will much more often than not come up empty.  A good part of the 
resources they will then employ will be values to which they can relate today.  If that is what it 
means for our Constitution to be a “living” one, then a living Constitution is inevitable.   
 
